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Abstract—This paper considers secure communication in
buffer-aided cooperative wireless networks in the presence of
one eavesdropper, which can intercept the data transmission
from both the source and relay nodes. A new max-ratio
relaying protocol is proposed, in which different relays are
chosen for reception and transmission according to the ratio
of the legitimate channels to the eavesdropper channels, so
that the relay selected for reception and the relay selected for
transmission can receive and transmit at the same time. It is
worth noting that the relay employs a randomize-and-forward
(RF) strategy such that the eavesdropper can only decode the
signals received in the two hops independently. Theoretical
analysis of the secrecy throughput of the proposed scheme
is provided and the approximate closed-form expressions are
derived, which are verified by simulations. Through numerical
results, it is shown that the proposed scheme achieves a
significant improvement in secrecy throughput compared with
existing relay selection policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication technologies play an important
role in military and civil applications, and their rapid de-
velopments have been promoting the evolution into the fifth
generation (5G) communication [1], [2]. However, the broad-
cast nature of wireless medium makes the communication
over wireless networks susceptible to the interception attacks
from unauthorized users (eavesdroppers), and thus guaran-
teeing the security of wireless communication is becoming
an increasingly urgent demand [3].
Traditionally, security issues are addressed by applying
cryptographic methods, which utilize secret keys and encryp-
tion/decryption algorithms to provide secure data streams, in
the upper layers of the network protocol stack [4]. However,
their applications may be limited by the inherent difficulty
of secret key management and the increasingly powerful
computation capability of the eavesdroppers. In the seminal
work [5], Wyner introduced the wiretap channel model
and established the possibility of creating perfectly secure
communication links without relying on secret keys. A rate
at which information can be transmitted securely from the
source to its intended destination is termed as achievable
secrecy rate, and secrecy capacity is the maximal achievable
secrecy rate. The secrecy capacity of the scalar Gaussian
wiretap channel was analyzed in [6]. Recently, physical layer
(PHY) security techniques have been considered as a promis-
ing solution to guarantee everlasting secure communication
for wireless networks by exploiting the inherent randomness
of wireless channels and noise, and have received a lot of
attention [7]-[18].
Of particular interest is the secure communication over
relay channels, which is one of the fundamental build-
ing blocks of communication systems. In [8], the relay-
eavesdropper channel was studied and different node co-
operation strategies were analyzed. It has been shown that
cooperative communication not only significantly improves
the transmission capacity for wireless networks, but also
provides an effective way to improve the secrecy capacity.
On top of that, several relay strategies have been designed in
literature [9]-[11]. Moreover, recent works have shown that
use of buffers at the relays make it possible to store packets
and transmit them in more favorable wireless conditions,
which greatly improves the security performance of wireless
communications [12]- [18]. For instance, in [12], we have
designed the link selection and power control policies for
secure communications over a buffer-aided two hop com-
munication link.
Note that a relay usually operates in either full-duplex
(FD) or half-duplex (HD) mode. In FD relaying, the relays
transmit and receive at the same time and frequency, at the
cost of hardware complexity [19], [20]. We consider a buffer-
aided relay system with multiple HD relays in this paper.
Inspired by the space full-duplex max-max relay selection
(SFD-MMRS) scheme in [21], which mimics FD relaying
with HD relays via link selection, we propose a new max-
ratio relay selection scheme for secure transmission in HD
randomize-and-forward (RF) buffer-aided relay networks in
this paper. In the proposed scheme, we select different relays
for reception and transmission according to the ratio of
the legitimate channels to the eavesdropper channels. We
analyze the secrecy throughput of the proposed scheme
in independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh
fading channels and derive the approximate closed-form
expressions. Numerical results in accordance with theoretical
analysis show the superiority of the proposed scheme over
the existing relay selection schemes.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. The
system model and two existing max-ratio relay selection
scheme for secure buffer-aided cooperative wireless net-
works are briefly introduced in Section II. In Section III, the
relay selection policy is proposed, comprehensive analysis
of the secrecy throughput is presented and the approximate
Fig. 1. Illustration of system model.
closed-form expressions are derived. Numerical results are
provided in Section IV. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
Section V with some lengthy proofs in Appendix.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
We consider a two-hop wireless communication system
consisting of one source node S, one destination node D,
a set of K relays R1, ..., RK adopting the RF decoding
strategy, and one eavesdropperE which can intercept signals
from both the source and relay nodes, as shown in Fig. 1.
Under the RF relaying strategy, the source and relay use
different codebooks to transmit the secret message, so the
eavesdropper cannot combine the data transmitted by source
and relay [11], [14]. We assume that each node is equipped
with a single antenna and operates in the HD mode. We
assume that there is a buffer of infinite length at each relay
such that each relay can store the information received from
the source and transmit it in later time.
We assume that there is no direct link between the source
and destination due to high attenuation, and the commu-
nications can be established only via relays. The channel
coefficients for S−Rk, Rk−D, S−E and Rk−E links at
time t are denoted as hsrk(t), hrkd(t), hse(t) and hrke(t),
respectively. The channel is assumed to be stationary and
ergodic. We consider the block fading, in which the channel
coefficients remain constant during one time slot and vary
independently from one to the other. In addition to fading,
all wireless links are impaired by additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) with variance N0. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the noise variances at the receiving nodes
are equal to one, i.e., N0 = 1. The source and relays are
assumed to transmit with power PS and PR respectively.
Throughout this paper, we consider the case of i.i.d.
Rayleigh fading for S − Ri, Ri − D, and Ri − E links,
which is a typical assumption to facilitate analysis [21]. We
assume that the mean of S − Rk, S − E, Rk − D and
Rk−E channel gains are E[|hsrk |
2] = γsr , E[|hse|
2] = γse,
E[|hrkd|
2] = γrd and E[|hrke|
2] = γre, respectively, where
E[·] denotes the expectation.
B. Existing Relaying Schemes
In this part, we review two existing relay selection proto-
cols for secure buffer-aided cooperative wireless networks.
1) Max-Min-Ratio Relay Selection: With the RF relaying
strategy applied at the relays, the instantaneous secrecy rate
for the buffer-aided multi-relay systems is obtained as [8]
Ck(t) =[
1
2
log2 max
k∈{1,...,K}
{
min
(
1 + PS |hsrk (t)|
2
1 + PS |hse(t)|2
,
1 + PR|hrkd(t)|
2
1 + PR|hrke(t)|
2
)}]+
,
(1)
where [·]+ = max{·, 0}. The secrecy throughput is given by
E[Ck]. If the exact knowledge of the eavesdropping channels
are available, the best relay node can be selected with the
maximum Ck(t). This scheme is termed as the max-min-
ratio relay selection in this paper. For convenience, the time
index t is ignored in the rest of the paper unless necessary.
2) Max-Link-Ratio Relay Selection: This protocol
chooses the best link with the highest gain ratio among
all available source-to-relay and relay-to-destination links
[17]. If the exact knowledge of all channels, including the
eavesdropping channels hse and hrke, are available, the
max-link-ratio selects the best relay Rk as
k = arg max
k∈{1,...,K}
{
max
k∈{1,...,K}
{|hsrk |
2}
|hse|2
, max
k∈{1,...,K}
{
|hrkd|
2
|hrke|
2
}}.
(2)
III. FULL CSI AT THE TRANSMITTERS
In this section, we assume the instantaneous channel state
information (CSI) of legitimate channels (i.e., |hsrk |
2 and
|hrkd|
2) are always known. Regarding the knowledge of
eavesdropper CSI, we consider the perfect CSI case where
the instantaneous eavesdropper CSI (i.e., |hse|
2 and |hrke|
2)
are available in this paper.
Note however that, when the eavesdropper is passive and
its behavior can not be monitored, the assumption of the
exact CSI of the eavesdroppers link might be unrealistic.
We also consider the partial CSI case where only the average
gains of the eavesdropping channels are available. Since the
derivations are similar, they are omitted in this paper due to
the limit of space.
A. Link Selection Policy
Inspired by the SFD-MMRS scheme, if the channel gains
of both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are
known at the transmitter, the best and the second best relay
for reception Rr1 and Rr2 are selected respectively based
on
r1 = arg max
k∈{1,...,K}
{
1 + PS|hsrk |
2
1 + PS|hse|2
}
,
r2 = arg max
k∈{1,...,K}
k 6=r1
{
1 + PS|hsrk |
2
1 + PS|hse|2
}
, (3)
2
and the best and the second best relay for transmission Rt1
and Rt2 are selected respectively according to
t1 = arg max
k∈{1,...,K}
{
1 + PR|hrkd|
2
1 + PR|hrke|
2
}
,
t2 = arg max
k∈{1,...,K}
k 6=t1
{
1 + PR|hrkd|
2
1 + PR|hrke|
2
}
. (4)
Denote
zr1 =
max
k∈{1,...,K}
{
1 + PS |hsrk |
2
}
1 + PS|hse|2
,
zt1 = max
k∈{1,...,K}
{
1 + PR|hrkd|
2
1 + PR|hrke|
2
}
,
zr2 =
max
k∈{1,...,K}
k 6=r1
{
1 + PS |hsrk |
2
}
1 + PS|hse|2
,
zt2 = max
k∈{1,...,K}
k 6=t1
{
1 + PR|hrkd|
2
1 + PR|hrke|
2
}
. (5)
Let
Q = min(zr1 , zt2)−min(zr2 , zt1). (6)
Then, in the proposed imitating full-duplex max-max-ratio
relay selection (IFD-MRRS) policy, the relays selected for
reception Rr¯1 and transmission Rt¯1 are chosen as
(Rr¯1 , Rt¯1) =


(Rr1 , Rt1), if r1 6= t1
(Rr1 , Rt2), if r1 = t1 and Q > 0
(Rr2 , Rt1), otherwise,
(7)
which means if the best S−R and the best R−D channels
do not share the same relay, i.e., r1 6= t1, we select the
relay with the best S−R channel for reception and the relay
with the best R −D channel for transmission. However, if
the same relay has the best S − R and R − D channel,
i.e., r1 = t1, we choose the best bottleneck link, i.e., if
Q > 0, and select the relay with the best S−R channel for
reception and the relay with the second best R−D channel
for transmission. Conversely, if Q < 0, we select the relay
with the second best S − R channel for reception and the
relay with the best R −D channel for transmission.
Note that the use of buffers make virtual full duplex
operations at the relays possible when two different relays
are selected for the reception and transmission (see, e.g.,
[17] and [21]).
B. Secrecy Throughput Analysis
Considering that we employ the RF relaying strategy
[10], the eavesdropper cannot combine the data transmitted
by source and relay at each time slot. Therefore, when
either the source wishes to transmit confidential informa-
tion to the relay or the relay sends private message to
the destination, we can view as a single hop transmission
in the presence of the interference from the other hop.
Assuming that the eavesdropper employs decoding with
successful interference cancellation and the decoding order
at the eavesdropper is not known at the source or the relays,
the maximum eavesdropping data rate is assumed to be
upperbounded by log2(1 + PS |hse|
2) for the link S − E,
and log2(1 + PR|hrke|
2) for the link Rk − E. If the relay
Rk is selected for the data transmission, the instantaneous
secrecy rate of the first and second hop are lowerbounded
by
CSR ≥
[
log2
(
1 + PS |hsrk |
2
1 + PS |hse|2
)]+
,
CRD ≥
[
log2
(
1 + PR|hrkd|
2
1 + PR|hrke|
2
)]+
, (8)
respectively. In the following, we adopt the lowerbound for
the analysis, which represents the worst case and specifies
the minimum throughput achievable.
Then the secrecy throughput for the buffer-aided multi-
relay system is given by [22]
Cs = min{E[CSR],E[CRD]}, (9)
where E[CSR] and E[CRD ] denote the average secrecy
throughput of the S −R and R−D links, respectively.
The average secrecy rate of the first and second hop, Ck,
k ∈ {SR,RD}, can be expressed as [21, (9)]
Ck = E[Ck] = (1 − ps)Ck,1 + ps(Ck,21 + Ck,22), (10)
where ps denote the probability that r1 = t1, Ck,1 is the
average throughput of the best channel of the first and second
hop, k ∈ {SR,RD}, Ck,21 and Ck,22 denote the average
throughput of the best channel and the second best channel
of the first and second hop when Q > 0 and Q < 0,
respectively.
Note that our selection policy involves eight independent
channel coefficients, and hence finding the closed-form
expressions is very tricky, if not intractable. So we derive the
approximate closed-form expressions for the average secrecy
throughput of the proposed scheme.
Proposition 1: The average secrecy rate of the first hop
E[CSR] can be approximately expressed as
E[CSR]
≈ (1− ps)E[CSR,1] + ps(p12E[CSR,1] + p21E[CSR,2]),
(11)
where ps denotes the probability that r1 = r2, p12 denotes
the probability that Q > 0, p21 denotes the probability that
Q < 0, E[CSR,1] and E[CSR,2] denote the average secrecy
capacity of the best and the second best S − R channel,
respectively. Similarly, the average secrecy rate of the second
hop E[CRD ] can be approximately expressed as
E[CRD]
≈ (1 − ps)E[CRD,1] + ps(p12E[CRD,2] + p21E[CRD,1]),
(12)
where E[CRD,1] and E[CRD,2] denote the average secrecy
capacity of the best and the second best R − D channel,
respectively.
Proof: Based on (7), we can divide the time index t into
3
three cases correspondingly. If r1 6= t1, we select the relay
with the best S−R channel for reception and the relay with
the best R − D channel for transmission. We denote such
indices as t ∈ Ω1. If r1 = t1 , we need to determine whether
Q is positive or negative, if Q > 0, we select the relay with
the best S − R channel for reception and the relay with
the second best R−D channel for transmission. We denote
such time indices as t ∈ Ω2. Inversely, if Q < 0, we select
the relay with the second best S −R channel for reception
and the relay with the best R−D channel for transmission,
and denote such time indices as t ∈ Ω3. Let N1 denote the
number of times in N transmissions that r1 = t1, and hence
N12 denote the number of time instances inN1 transmissions
that Q > 0, and N21 denote the number of time instances
in N1 transmissions that Q > 0, i.e., ps =
N1
N
, p12 =
N12
N1
,
and p21 =
N21
N1
.
Consider the first hop. The average secrecy rate is given
by
E[CSR]
= lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
t=1
CSR(t)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(∑
t∈Ω1
CSRr1 (t) +
∑
t∈Ω2
CSRr1 (t) +
∑
t∈Ω3
CSRr2 (t)
)
= lim
N→∞
N −N1
N
1
N −N1
∑
t∈Ω1
CSR(t)
+
N1
N
·
N12
N1
1
N12
∑
t∈Ω2
CSR(t) +
N1
N
·
N21
N1
1
N21
∑
t∈Ω3
CSR(t)
= (1− ps)E[CSR,1] + ps · p12E[CSR,1] + ps · p21E[CSR,2].
(13)
The average secrecy rate of the second hop can be proved
by the same logic. 
Proposition 2: Assume that full CSI of the eavesdropper’s
channels are known. Given PS and PR, the detailed expres-
sions for the terms in (11) and (12) can be expressed as
follows:
ps =
1
K
, (14)
E[CSR,1] =
K∑
r=1
(
K
r
)
(−1)r
e
r
PSγsr
ln 2
[
−E1
(
r
PSγsr
)
+ e
1
PSγse E1
(
r
PSγsr
+
1
PSγse
)]
, (15)
E[CSR,2] =
K−1∑
r=1
(
K − 1
r
)
(−1)r
e
r
PSγsr
ln 2
[
−E1
(
r
PSγsr
)
+ e
1
PSγse E1
(
r
PSγsr
+
1
PSγse
)]
+
(
K − 1
K − 2
)
K−1∑
r=0
(
K − 1
r
)
(−1)r
e
r+1
PSγsr
ln 2[
−E1
(
r + 1
PSγsr
)
+ e
1
PSγse E1
(
r + 1
PSγsr
+
1
PSγse
)]
, (16)
p12 =
∫ ∞
0
fzr2 (z)(1− Fzt2 (z))dz, (17)
where
fZr2 (z) =
K−1∑
r=0
(
K − 1
r
)
(−1)re
−
(z−1)r
PSγsr

 − rPSγsr
1 + γser
γsr
z
−
γser
γsr(
1 + γser
γsr
z
)2

+
(
K − 1
K − 2
)
K−1∑
r=0
(
K − 1
r
)
(−1)re
−
(z−1)(r+1)
PSγsr

 − r+1PSγsr
1 + γse(r+1)
γsr
z
−
γse(r+1)
γsr(
1 + γse(r+1)
γsr
z
)2

 ,
FZt2 (z) =
(
1−
e
− z−1
PRγrd
1 + γrez
γrd
)K−1(
1 +
(
K − 1
K − 2
)
e
− z−1
PRγrd
1 + γrez
γrd
)
.
Remark 1: Note that E[CSR] can be obtained by substi-
tuting the above equations into (11).
Similarly, we can obtained the expressions for E[CRD].
Proof: The probability that the best S − R and the best
R − D channels share the same relay is ps =
1
K
[21], it
follows directly from the fact that the channels for both S−R
and R − D links are i.i.d. And it is obvious that we have
p21 = 1 − p12. So, to compute the secrecy throughput of
IFD-MRRS, we need to find E[CSR,1], E[CRD,1], E[CSR,2],
E[CRD,2] and p12.
Computation of E[CSR,1]: In this case, we denote
zr1 =
1+PSx
1+PSy
, where x = max{xk} with xk = |hsrk |
2, k ∈
{1, 2, ...,K}, and y = |hse|
2. To derive E[CSR,1], we first
compute the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of zr1 .
E[CSR,1] can be obtained as
E[CSR,1] =
K∑
r=1
(
K
r
)
(−1)r
e
r
PSγsr
ln 2
[
− E1
(
r
PSγsr
)
+ e
1
PSγse E1
(
r
PSγsr
+
1
PSγse
)]
, (18)
where E1(x) =
∫∞
x
(e−t/t)dt, x > 0 is the exponential
integral function. See Appendix A for the derivation of (18).
Computation of E[CRD,1]: In this case, we denote
zt1 = max
k∈{1,2,...,K}
{zk}, where zk =
1+PRxk
1+PRyk
with xk =
|hrkd|
2 and yk = |hrke|
2. Since xk is independent of yk, we
have fXkYk(xk, yk) = fXk(xk)fYk(yk). To derive E[CSR,1],
we first compute the CDF of zk, then we can calculate the
CDF of zt1 . E[CRD,1] is given by
E[CRD,1]
=
K∑
r=1
(
K
r
)
(−1)r
γree
r
PR
(
1
γrd
+ 1
γre
)
ln 2γrd[
− e
− r
PRγre E1
(
r
PRγrd
)
+
r∑
i=1
( (−1)i+1 ( r
PRγre
)i+1
E1
(
r
PR
(
1
γrd
+ 1
γre
))
(i− 1)!
+
e
− r
PR
(
1
γrd
+ 1
γre
)
(
γre
γrd
+ 1
)i−1
i−2∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
r
PRγre
)j (
γre
γrd
+ 1
)j
(i− 1)(i− 2)...(i− 1− j)
)]
.
(19)
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See Appendix B for the derivation of (19).
Computation of E[CSR,2] and E[CRD,2]: To compute
E[CSR,2] and E[CRD,2], we need to compute the CDF of
zr2 and zt2 , so we consider the following theorem of order
statistics:
Theorem 1 ([23]): Let Z1, ..., Zn be n independent vari-
ates, each with cdf F (z). Let Z1, ..., Zn denote the increas-
ing order of Z1, ..., Zn, i.e., Z(1) ≤ Z(2) ≤ Z(n). Let
F(r)(z), (r = 1, ..., n) denote the cdf of the r th order
statistic Z(r). Then the cdf of Z(r) is given by
F(r)(z) = F
r(z)
n−r∑
j=0
(
r + j + 1
r − 1
)
[1− F (z)]j . (20)
Based on (20), we obtain
FZr2 (z) =
K−1∑
r=0
(
K − 1
r
)
(−1)r
e
−
(z−1)r
PSγsr
1 + γsezr
γsr
+
(
K − 1
K − 2
)
K−1∑
r=0
(
K − 1
r
)
(−1)r
e
−
(z−1)(r+1)
PSγsr
1 + γsez(r+1)
γsr
,
(21)
FZt2 (z) =
(
1−
e
− z−1
PRγrd
1 + γrez
γrd
)K−1(
1 +
(
K − 1
K − 2
)
e
− z−1
PRγrd
1 + γrez
γrd
)
.
(22)
Since the computation of E[CSR,2] is similar to that of
E[CSR,1], the computation of E[CRD,2] is similar to that of
E[CRD,1], the details of the computation are omitted here.
E[CSR,2] is given by
E[CSR,2]
=
K−1∑
r=1
(
K − 1
r
)
(−1)r
e
r
PSγsr
ln 2[
−E1
(
r
PSγsr
)
+ e
1
PSγse E1
(
r
PSγsr
+
1
PSγse
)]
+
(
K − 1
K − 2
)
K−1∑
r=0
(
K − 1
r
)
(−1)r
e
r+1
PSγsr
ln 2[
−E1
(
r + 1
PSγsr
)
+ e
1
PSγse E1
(
r + 1
PSγsr
+
1
PSγse
)]
. (23)
And E[CRD,2] can be obtained as
E[CRD,2]
=
K−1∑
r=1
(
K − 1
r
)
(−1)r
γree
r
PR
(
1
γrd
+ 1
γre
)
ln 2γrd[
− e
− r
PRγre E1
(
r
PRγrd
)
+
r∑
i=1
( (−1)i+1 ( r
PRγre
)i+1
E1
(
r
PR
(
1
γrd
+ 1
γre
))
(i− 1)!
+
e
− r
PR
(
1
γrd
+ 1
γre
)
(
γre
γrd
+ 1
)i−1
i−2∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
r
PRγre
)j (
γre
γrd
+ 1
)j
(i− 1)(i− 2)...(i − 1− j)
)]
+
(
K − 1
K − 2
)
K−1∑
r=0
(
K − 1
r
)
(−1)r
γree
r+1
PR
(
1
γrd
+ 1
γre
)
ln 2γrd[
− e
− r+1
PRγre E1
(
r + 1
PRγrd
)
+
r+1∑
i=1
( (−1)i+1 ( r+1
PRγre
)i+1
E1
(
r+1
PR
(
1
γrd
+ 1
γre
))
(i− 1)!
+
e
− r+1
PR
(
1
γrd
+ 1
γre
)
(
γre
γrd
+ 1
)i−1
i−2∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
r+1
PRγre
)j (
γre
γrd
+ 1
)j
(i− 1)(i− 2)...(i − 1− j)
)]
.
(24)
Computation of p12: Given that zr1 > zr2 , zt1 > zt2 ,
we have
p12 = P{Q > 0} = P{min(zr1 , zt2) > min(zr2 , zt1)}
= P{zt2 > zr2} =
∫∫
zt2>zr2
fzr2 ,zt2 (zr2 , zt2)dzr2dzt2
=
∫ ∞
0
fzr2 (z)(1− Fzt2 (z))dz. (25)
Since we have obtained the CDF of zr2 and zt2 , we can
express the probability of Q > 0 , i.e., p12, as an integral
form and calculate its value numerically.
Note that E[CSR] can be obtained by substituting (18),
(23) and p12 into (11), E[CRD ] can be obtained by substi-
tuting (19), (24) and p12 into (12). Finally, the approximate
closed-form expression of the secrecy throughput of the
proposed scheme is obtained by substituting (11) and (12)
into (9).
Given the total power constraint SNR of the network,
we can allocate the total power to the source and relays
to achieve the best performance.
Regarding IFD-MRRS scheme, we need to allocate trans-
mit energy to source andK relays. The sources works for all
time slots, therefore, we should have (PS +KPR) ≤ SNR.
For max-link-ratio scheme, we should allocate transmit
power to the source and K relays for each time slot to
enable each link to be capable of being selected for reception
or transmission, so we should have (PS + KPR) ≤ SNR
as well. With max-min-ratio scheme, similarly, we should
allocate transmit energy to the source and K relays, albeit
the data transmission occupies two time slots, so we should
have 12 (PS +KPR) ≤ SNR.
Consider the derived expressions of secrecy throughput,
once given the total power SNR, it is obvious that when
PS is small, the throughput is limited by first hop. On
the other hand, when PR is small, the second hop will
be the bottleneck of the system. Therefore, there is always
an optimal power allocation that maximizes the secrecy
throughput.
Definition 1: The maximum secrecy throughput of IFD-
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Fig. 2. The secrecy throughput versus PS/PR for different relaying
protocols.
MRRS is given by
Cmax = max
(PS+KPR)≤SNR
CIFD−MRRS(PS , PR). (26)
Similarly, we can define the maximum secrecy throughput
for max-min-ratio scheme and max-link-ratio scheme.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, simulation results are given to verify the
secrecy throughput for the proposed IFD-MRRS scheme. We
assume that γsr = γrd = γse = γre = 2, unless specified
otherwise.
Fig. 2 plots the secrecy throughput versus PS/PR for
each scheme, where the relay number is set as K = 3.
We assume SNR = 10 dB. We can find that the secrecy
throughput always has a peak value as PS/PR varies, and
the proposed scheme achieves the largest throughput. It is
interesting that, each scheme does not achieve the maximum
secrecy throughput when PS
PR
= 1, i.e., PS = PR. This is
because, the distribution of the channels for the two hops is
not symmetric, which can also be seen from the selection
strategy (5). We also note that the analytical results obtained
based on the derivation in Section III are very close to the
simulation results, which verifies the approximate closed-
form expressions.
In Fig. 3, we compare the maximum secrecy throughput
of the proposed scheme with that of two existing max-ratio
schemes as SNR varies, where the relay number is set as
K = 3. We can find that the proposed scheme achieves the
best performance with power allocation. Also, we can find
that the approximate expression holds for a wide range of
SNR values.
Fig. 4 plots the maximum secrecy throughput of each
scheme versus the number of relays for SNR = 10 dB.
We can find that the proposed scheme achieves the best
performance in all cases. It is clearly shown that, the increase
of the relay number can significantly improve the secrecy
throughput performance.
Fig. 3. The maximum secrecy throughput versus SNR for different relaying
protocols.
Fig. 4. The maximum secrecy throughput versus different numbers of
relays.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an IFD-MRRS protocol
for secure communications over buffer-aided cooperative
relay networks. Notice that we considers the RF strategy
such that the eavesdropper can only independently decode
the signals received in the two hops. With the help of buffers
at the relays, different relays for reception and transmission
have been selected with the largest or the second largest
ratio among S −R and R −D links. Approximate closed-
form expressions for the secrecy throughput were derived.
Numerical results in consistence with the analytical expres-
sions show that the distribution of the channels of the two
hop is not symmetric, and the proposed IFD-MRRS scheme
achieves significantly higher secrecy throughput compared
with two existing relay selection protocols for secure buffer-
aided cooperative wireless networks.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of expression (18)
We first compute the CDF of x, the CDF of x can be
obtained as
FX(x) = P {max{xk} ≤ x}
= P{x1 ≤ x}P{x2 ≤ x}...P{xK ≤ x}
=
(
1− e−
x
γsr
)K
. (27)
Since x is independent of y, we have fXY (x, y) =
fX(x)fY (y). Then the CDF of zr1 can be calculated as
FZr1 (z)
= P
{
1 + PSX
1 + PSY
≤ z
}
=
∫∫
1+PSx
1+PSy
≤z
fXY (x, y)dxdy
=
∫ ∞
0
fY (y) · FX(x)|
z
PS
+yz− 1
PS
0 dy
=
∫ ∞
0
1
γse
e
− y
γse ·
K∑
r=0
(
K
r
)(
−e
− z−1
PSγsr e
− yz
γsr
)r
dy
=
K∑
r=0
(
K
r
)
(−1)r ·
e
−
(z−1)r
PSγsr
zrγse
γsr
+ 1
. (28)
Then, we have
E[CSR,1]
= log2z
(
FZr1 (z)− 1
) ∣∣∞
1
−
∫ ∞
1
(
FZr1 (z)− 1
)
d(log2z)
= −
K∑
r=1
(
K
r
)
(−1)r
e
r
PSγsr
ln 2
∫ ∞
1
(
e
− zr
PSγsr
z
−
e
− zr
PSγsr
z + γsr
γser
)
dz
=
K∑
r=1
(
K
r
)
(−1)r
e
r
PSγsr
ln 2
[
− E1
(
r
PSγsr
)
+ e
1
PSγse E1
(
r
PSγsr
+
1
PSγse
)]
(29)
where E1(x) =
∫∞
x
(e−t/t)dt, x > 0 is the exponential
integral function.
B. Proof of expression (19)
The CDF of zk can be obtained as
FZk(zk) = P
{
1 + PRXk
1 + PRYk
≤ zk
}
=
∫∫
1+PRxk
1+PRyk
≤zk
fXkYk (xk, yk)dxkdyk
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ zk
PR
+ykzk−
1
PR
0
fXkYk(xk, yk)dxkdyk
= 1−
e
−
zk−1
γrdPR
1 + zkγre
γrd
. (30)
Then the CDF of zt1 can be calculated as
FZt1 (z) = P{Zt1 ≤ z} = P{max{Zk} ≤ z}
= P{Z1 ≤ z}{Z2 ≤ z}...{ZK ≤ z}
=
(
1−
e
− z−1
PRγrd
1 + zγre
γrd
)K
.
(31)
After computation of FZt1 (z) and after some simplifications,
E[CRD,1] can be obtained as
E[CRD,1]
= −
K∑
r=1
(
K
r
)
(−1)r
e
r
PRγrd
ln 2
∫ ∞
1
e
− zr
PRγrd
z
(
1 + γre
γrd
z
)r dz
u=1+ γre
γrd
z
========= −
K∑
r=1
(
K
r
)
(−1)r
e
r
PRγrd
ln 2
∫ ∞
γre
γrd
+1
e
−
r(u−1)
PRγre
γrd
γre
(u− 1)ur
du
= −
K∑
r=1
(
K
r
)
(−1)r
e
(
r
PRγrd
+ r
PRγre
)
ln 2γrd
γre∫ ∞
γre
γrd
+1
(
e
− r
PRγre
u
u− 1
−
r∑
i=1
e
− r
PRγre
u
ui
)
du
=
K∑
r=1
(
K
r
)
(−1)r
γree
r
PR
(
1
γrd
+ 1
γre
)
ln 2γrd
[
− e
− r
PRγre E1
(
r
PRγrd
)
+
r∑
i=1
( (−1)i+1 ( r
PRγre
)i+1
E1
(
r
PR
(
1
γrd
+ 1
γre
))
(i− 1)!
+
e
− r
PR
(
1
γrd
+ 1
γre
)
(
γre
γrd
+ 1
)i−1
i−2∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
r
PRγre
)j (
γre
γrd
+ 1
)j
(i− 1)(i− 2)...(i− 1− j)
)]
.
(32)
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